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Abstract 
 
Transparency has been a major trend in reforms of political institutions and public admin-
istrations in the last decades. This article analyses the main rationale for supplying trans-
parency from the governing elites’ perspective, namely that it generates legitimacy 
among the constituents. Although working in a goldfish bowl entails costs for gov-
ernments the prospect of increased support weighs heavily on the other side. But does 
transparency have the power to increase public legitimacy? 
We make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to this question. The 
theoretical contribution lies in identifying plausible causal mechanisms that may drive a 
positive – or a negative – link between transparency and legitimacy. We discuss three 
different theories of decision-making, from which such mechanisms may be derived. We 
find that the common notion of a fairly straightforward positive correlation between 
transparency and legitimacy is rather naïve. The effect is highly dependent on the con-
text, which makes transparency reforms rather unpredictable phenomena. 
Empirically, we study representative decision-making in a school context. We use 
vignette experiments to test the effect of transparency on legitimacy under different con-
ditions. Our findings indicate that transparency can indeed increase the legitimacy of rep-
resentative decision-making. People who are informed about decisions which affect their 
everyday lives are more willing to accept the process by which the decisions were taken 
if they are given insight into the reasoning behind the decisions. Interestingly, however, 
this insight need not be derived from “fishbowl transparency”, with full openness of the 
decision-making process. Decision-makers may significantly improve the legitimacy 
simply by motivating carefully afterwards the decisions taken behind closed doors (trans-
parency in rationale). Only when transparency displays behaviour close to a deliberative 
democratic ideal (respectful and rational argumentation) will full openness of the process 
improve on closed-door decision-making with post-decision motivations. 
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Introduction  
 
Public administrations and political organisations world-wide have experienced a transpar-
ency rush in the last decades. Government documents are being released, votes are pub-
lished and deliberations are being broadcasted on the internet. The idea that sunshine is the 
best disinfectant is widespread in academic discussions as well as in the economic and public 
realm, and transparency has become a notion of “quasi-religious significance” (Hood 2006, 
c.f. Etzioni 2010). Transparency is now a universally prescribed recipe for curing a wide 
range of problems of modern government, relating to inefficiency, corruption and bad per-
formance (Roberts 2006, Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). The suggestion that open doors 
may be refreshing is not new (c.f. Bentham 1816[1999]), but the extent to which the idea is 
in fact being implemented across the democratised world is unprecedented. 
Social science research has contributed to our understanding of the effects of the trans-
parency boom in several ways. In international relations transparency has been acknow-
ledged for its potential to contribute to regime effectiveness and to reduce the risks of con-
flicts and war (Choi & James 2006, Mitchell 1998, Schultz 1998, Fearon 1995). Economists 
have increasingly emphasized the crucial role played by information for avoiding market fail-
ures and for achieving efficient allocation of resources (Stiglitz 2000). Political philosophy 
has seen the revival of the theory of deliberative democracy, where publicity is a core con-
cept and where openness of debate is considered to have a civilizing effect on political be-
havior (Elster 1998). Within public administration and comparative politics transparency is 
considered a shield against corruption and bad governance (Lindstedt & Naurin 2010, Bru-
netti & Weder 2003).  
Research has also revealed that transparency have costs, however. Transparency may 
have adverse effects for the efficiency of decision-making processes and the quality of deci-
sions. “Although it is certainly important that the public have access to relevant information 
about administration”, according to one observer, “working in a goldfish bowl can rarely be 
as efficient as working in private” (Peters 1995, p. 297). Transparency may raise conformist 
pressures (Elster 1998, Naurin 2007, Prat 2005, Stasavage 2004, 2007), strengthen the incen-
tives for public posturing and ‘plebicitory rhetoric’ (Chambers 2004, Vermeule 2009,), re-
duce incentives to work hard to prove one’s worth (Holmström 1999), and increase the risk 
for negotiation breakdown (Groseclose and McCarty 2001).  One puzzling aspect of the race 
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towards transparency is why politicians and bureaucrats choose to release information about 
their actions. Transparency reduces their information advantage and room for manoeuvre. 
Why would they want to work in a goldfish bowl? The reason probably has less to do with 
political and administrative elites seeking to create the right incentives for themselves. Ra-
ther, the rationale behind implementing transparency reforms, from the governments’ per-
spective, lies in the perceived effect of transparency on those who will hold them to account. 
There is a widespread perception that openness increases the perceived legitimacy of the de-
cision-making (Worthy 2010). 
For example, in the early 1990s the European Union allegedly experienced a legitimacy 
crisis, with declining trust among the Europeans and subsequent difficulties with getting 
agreed upon treaties ratified in the member states. As a response “transparency” entered the 
EU vocabulary. Several reforms were implemented during the years that followed, aimed at 
providing more information about how EU laws were made, including publishing the votes 
of the Council of Ministers, providing more access to documents and broadcasting meetings 
of ministers. Similarly, the “Sunlight before signing” promise that Barak Obama gave during 
his presidential campaign was interpreted as an attempt to increase public trust after the 
Bush administration (Coglianese 2009). 
But how realistic is this assumption? Can transparency generate legitimacy for decision-
making institutions? On this point, research is much less developed, both theoretically and 
empirically. So far, research on the effects of transparency has focused mainly on those ac-
tors and activities that have been the objects of transparency – the decisions, decision-
makers and decision-making processes at the elite level. How transparency affects those who 
are supposed to be watching is a different question, which has received surprisingly little at-
tention both theoretically and empirically. One of the main driving forces behind the trans-
parency rush – the presumed link between transparency and legitimacy –  is in fact based 
mainly on intuition. 
In this article we analyse the relationship between transparency and legitimacy. We make 
both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. The theoretical contribution lies in identify-
ing causal mechanisms that may connect transparency and legitimacy, both positively and 
negatively. We discuss three theories of decision-making, from which such mechanisms may 
be derived. We find that the common notion of a fairly straightforward positive correlation 
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between transparency and legitimacy is rather naïve. The effect is highly dependent on the 
context and may indeed be negative as well as positive. 
To capture some of the contextual complexity, the article presents an empirical test of 
the effect of transparency on legitimacy, under different conditions. For this purpose we use 
an experimental design, applied in a context that resembles political decision-making. A total 
of 400 upper secondary students (age 16-19) schools were recruited to the experiment. They 
were presented with different vignette scenarios concerning decision-making by students’ 
and teachers’ representatives on the rules of behaviour at the school. The experimental de-
sign makes it possible to achieve a high degree of internal validity, which previous studies of 
transparency often lack.  
Our empirical findings indicate that transparency can indeed increase the legitimacy of 
representative decision-making. People who are informed about decisions which affect their 
everyday life are more willing to accept the process if they are given insight into the reason-
ing behind the decision. Interestingly, however, this insight need not be derived from “fish-
bowl transparency”, with full openness of the decision-making process. Decision-makers 
may improve the legitimacy by simply motivating carefully afterwards the decisions taken 
behind closed doors. Only when transparency displays behaviour close to a deliberative 
democratic ideal (respectful and rational argumentation) will full openness of the process 
improve on closed-door decision-making with post-decision motivations. 
 
 
Transparency and legitimacy, some conceptual notes 
 
Transparency refers to a continuous rather than a binary variable, which indicates the degree 
to which information is made available about how and why decisions are produced within a 
certain institution. We use the distinction between transparency in process and transparency 
in rationale to define two main forms of transparency (C.f. Mansbridge 2009).  
Transparency in rationale refers to information on the substance of the decision, and 
of the facts and reasons on which it was based. Such information is normally directed to-
wards an outside audience, which may be affected by the decision but is not involved in the 
decision-making. One example is the monthly press conferences of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), where the President of the ECB announces and motivates the decision on in-
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terest rates taken by the Governing Council. The information released by the ECB does not 
concern the positions and arguments taken by different members of the Governing Council 
during the discussions, but rather includes a coherent motivation on behalf of the ECB as a 
collective.  
Transparency in process, on the other hand, refers to information on actions such as 
deliberations, negotiations and votes that took place among and between the decision-
makers during the decision-making process, and thus directly fed into the decision. Such in-
formation may be made available in real time (fishbowl transparency) or in retrospect after 
the decision has been taken. The latter case is applied by some central banks, such as the 
American Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which release minutes of meetings and 
votes at some delay after the decision. An example of fishbowl transparency is the broad-
casting of the meetings of the Council of the EU. 
The distinction is important because transparency in process and transparency in ration-
ale are likely to have different effects on the decision-making process and potentially on the 
outcome. Transparency in process will be more vulnerable to the efficiency costs discussed 
in the literature (conformist pressures, public posturing, plebicitory rhetoric etc). Transpar-
ency in rationale, on the other hand, gives the decision-makers more room for manoeuvre 
until the decision is taken, as well as an opportunity to window dress in retrospect what was 
actually going on during the process. Still, having a giving-reason requirement post-decision 
may push the decision-makers towards making decisions that can be publicly defended in a 
credible way (Cf. Shapiro 1992). Thus, as Mansbridge has argued, from a normative view on 
representation transparency in rationale may bring some of the positive effects of transpar-
ency, while avoiding some of the costs that come with transparency in process (Mansbridge 
2009:386). We will analyse how transparency in rationale compares with transparency in pro-
cess when it comes to generating legitimacy of the process.  
Throughout the article we refer to legitimacy as a belief among the public that the ap-
pointed decision-makers have the right to make the decisions, and that these decisions 
should be accepted (Cf. Tyler 2006). In our use, legitimacy is a matter of perceptions and not 
a matter of what is legitimate in a normative sense.  Legitimacy is highly valuable from a 
government’s point of view as it will increase the chances that its decisions will be followed 
voluntarily (Levi, Sachs and Tyler 2009, Rothstein 2005). In our empirical study legitimacy 
will be operationalised as procedure acceptance. 
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Why would transparency generate legitimacy? 
 
We have already noted that the claim that transparency in political institutions increases le-
gitimacy is usually based on intuition rather than systematic theorising. Nevertheless, there is 
fairly strong theoretical backing for this proposition. In this section we discuss three theories 
of decision-making - agency theory, deliberative democracy theory and procedural fairness 
theory - from which different types of mechanisms that may drive a positive link can be de-
rived.  
 
Agency theory: Increasing control 
Within a rational choice framework, agency theory suggests that transparency may reduce 
uncertainty about the agent’s (e.g. the decision-makers in a representative democracy) behav-
iour in situations characterised by moral hazard, thereby making the principal (e.g. the public 
in a representative democracy) more confident in delegating powers to the agent (Holm-
ström 1979). A principal-agent relationship contains information asymmetry to the agent’s 
advantage, both about the state of the world and the agent’s preferences, competences and 
actions. Letting the principal ‘see for itself’ how well the agent completes its tasks may re-
duce suspicion and therefore increase the legitimacy of the agent, according to this perspec-
tive. Ferejohn has argued that agents who are taking this effect into account are likely to of-
fer a higher degree of openness of its actions to its principal in exchange for further invest-
ments in power (Ferejohn 1999). The transparency reforms in the European Union imple-
mented as a response to the legitimacy crisis of the early 1990s can be interpreted as a hope 
on behalf of the EU institutions that this mechanism would work ex post.  
This rational choice mechanism applies primarily to transparency in process, and less to 
transparency in rationale. The latter, which refers to the agent’s efforts to motivate its deci-
sions to the principal in retrospect by means of giving persuasive reasons, may always be 
dismissed as cheap talk by rational actors.  
 
Deliberative democratic theory: Force of the better argument and increased respect for out-group 
According to deliberative democratic theory transparency may contribute to a better under-
standing of the reasons behind a decision, and therefore to higher levels of legitimacy for 
 8 
both decisions and decision-makers (see, for example, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
Bohman and Rehg 1997, Elster 1998). Being convinced of the merits of the decision through 
the force of the better argument, on the one hand, and gaining increased respect for alterna-
tive views, on the other hand, are two different deliberative mechanisms with the potential 
of driving a positive effect on legitimacy. Public deliberation on behalf of the decision-
makers may both inform the citizens of the facts in the case and clarify – and possibly in-
crease the tolerance for –  different normative values and worldviews defended by represen-
tatives of different groups and perspectives that feed into the decision. According to deliber-
ative democratic theory such increased understanding will raise peoples’ willingness to accept 
decisions in the face of any remaining disagreements after the deliberations.  
The deliberative mechanisms may be triggered both by transparency in process and by 
transparency in rationale, as long as reasons and reason-givers are made public. Actors in a 
deliberative mode treat given reasons as sincere, and therefore evaluate the quality rather 
than the credibility of the information. 
 
Procedural fairness theory: Clarifying just procedures and making procedures more just 
According to procedural fairness theory, the procedure by which a decision comes about 
may contribute to legitimacy. The procedure is assigned a value in itself, which spills over to 
the evaluation of the decision, the decision-makers and the decision-making institutions. 
Social psychology research has indicated that people are more likely to accept decisions 
which are arrived at by a procedure that is considered to be fair, and are more satisfied with 
authorities and institutions using procedures that are considered to be fair, also when con-
trolling for the preferred outcome (Thibaut and Walker 1975, Tyler et. al. 1997, Napier and 
Tyler 2008, Tyler 2000, 2006, Ambrose 2002). Aspects of the procedure that have been 
found relevant in the literature include opportunity for voice, impartiality and respectful 
treatment.  
Transparency of the procedure is a prerequisite for the procedural fairness effect. Only 
if people are aware of the procedure can they judge its fairness. Clarifying the procedures by 
increasing transparency may therefore contribute to legitimacy, under the condition that the 
procedures illuminated will be considered as fair. However, transparency  is also commonly 
considered a procedural value in itself (Birkenshaw 2006), and therefore a transparent pro-
cedure might be considered as more fair simply because intuition says that political institu-
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tions should be open and transparent rather than closed and secretive. Transparency may 
thus increase legitimacy in two ways, according to a procedural fairness perspective; by clari-
fying (already) fair  procedures, and by making the procedures more fair.  
The clarification part of the procedural fairness effect relates to how decisions are taken, 
and therefore primarily concerns transparency in process. The making-procedures-more-fair 
mechanism, however, also applies to transparency in rationale. Motivating carefully the deci-
sions ex post may create a sense among the public of being treated with respect, which in 
turn may increase the sympathy for the decision-makers and the acceptance of the decision. 
 
 
Why transparency might to the contrary decrease legitimacy 
 
Assuming that most information published about its actions is likely to be controlled by the 
decision-makers, and given the possibility of window-dressing, there should be little room 
for negative effects of transparent procedures on legitimacy. It seems from the perspective 
of governments that transparency is a fairly cheap way to buy legitimacy, without much risk 
for a backlash. However, in this section we discuss three general categories of mechanisms 
that may to the contrary cause openness to decrease the level of legitimacy: Anticipation of 
bad decisions, frustration caused by powerlessness and disappointment with the decision-
makers or the state of the world.   
 
Agency theory: Anticipating distorted decision-making  
Returning to agency theory, the principal may anticipate negative effects on the agent’s be-
haviour as a result of transparency, and therefore become more sceptical towards its deci-
sions. As already mentioned, even though openness is usually considered a positive feature 
of decision-making, several reasons for why transparency may also have adverse effects on 
the efficiency of decision-making processes and the quality of decisions have been suggested. 
To the extent that a rational principal anticipates such detrimental effects (such as posturing, 
conformism and fixed positions) open procedures are likely to weaken its support for the 
decision-making.  
Stasavage has developed a theory in which the public suspects that their representatives’ 
desires to please them interfere with their judgement with respect to the decisions they take. 
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According to the theory when representatives make decisions in public they face incentives 
to use their actions as a signal of loyalty to their constituents, potentially ignoring private in-
formation about the true desirability of different policies. Stasavage assumes that the public 
is aware of the charade and therefore does not take publicly stated positions and arguments 
seriously, “because it knows that representatives are not conditioning their actions on their 
private information about which policy is optimal” (Stasavage 2007, p. 61). The result is that 
openness leads to citizens feeling less informed, as they cease to take cues from their repre-
sentatives positions when they no longer believe that these reflect their true preferences. Sta-
savage does not explicitly connect his findings to the legitimacy of the decision-making insti-
tutions, but one of the implications of the theory is that public decision-making may lead to 
decreasing confidence in both the decisions and the decision-making institutions. 
Again, as with Ferejohn’s agency model, which predicted a positive effect, the rationality 
assumed on the actors makes this mechanism apply less to transparency in rationale, as ex 
post motivations will be equated with cheap talk. 
 
Procedural fairness theory: Being reminded of lack of influence may provoke frustration 
Transparency that is not accompanied by credible mechanisms for accountability or for giv-
ing the decision-makers new mandates, may rather arouse frustration than increase the le-
gitimacy of the decisions and the decision-makers. Reducing uncertainty about the decision-
makers behaviour in a situation where the public does not have real possibilities to act on the 
information it receives will hardly encourage further trust and delegation of power. Knowing 
more about what one’s representatives do without being able to do anything about it –  
should one so wish – may instead lead to stronger feelings of powerlessness, compared to a 
situation of ignorance about how the decision-makers perform their tasks. Agency theory 
usually assumes that effective accountability mechanisms are in place –  if the principal is 
unhappy with the agent’s performance it can impose sanctions or rewrite the contract – but 
in politics that is not always the case in practice. The ultimate accountability mechanism in 
representative democracies is elections. This is a crude instrument, however, and voters who 
observe their representatives’ actions, and want to have the possibility to hold them to ac-
count somehow, may find it too abstract and limited.  
The procedural fairness research contains empirical findings that seem to support the 
idea of such a “frustration effect”. The general result in this literature, as noted before, is that 
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people who are given voice in relation to the decision (even if only ex post) are more in-
clined to accept the decision. However, the negative no-voice effect is even stronger if peo-
ple are explicitly reminded that they have no voice (van den Bos 1999). Furthermore, there is 
also evidence from both experimental and survey research that “voice with little influence 
produces more negative reactions than no voice” (Ulbig 2008, p. 525. Cf. Cohen 1985). 
Transparency may produce a frustration effect if it reminds people that they could or should 
have more influence than what they actually have due to weak accountability mechanisms. 
This mechanism is likely to apply primarily to transparency in process, which allows people 
to observe what is going on without having the opportunity to interfere. 
 
Bismarck: Reduced ignorance may cause disappointment 
Otto van Bismarck famously reminds us of another plausible condition for a positive trans-
parency effect, namely that the public likes - or at least does not dislike - what it gets to see: 
“Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made.”1 
If the sausage is made of rat meat, publishing the recipe will hardly make it more tasteful. 
This seemingly obvious circumstance has been surprisingly neglected in the transparency 
rush.  
There may be many sources of disappointment, of course, such as corruption, lazi-
ness and incompetence. Transparency in rationale gives the decision-makers the opportunity 
to polish the reasons made public, and to counter disappointment by engaging in different 
types of window-dressing. However, sometimes they may misunderstand the expectations of 
the audience, or are unable or unwilling to find a suitable window dress to conceal its back-
stage behaviour. The public, on the other hand, may misinterpret the information released, 
or have unrealistic expectations about how political decision-making works, or about the 
state of the world. Furthermore, a free media taking advantage of transparency in process 
normally searches for and prefers to report on bad rather than good news. Information 
transmission and processing are complicated phenomena, and disappointment effects may 
arise both from transparency in rationale and transparency in process. 
 
                                                
1 Whether the quote is correctly attributed to the Iron Chancellor is another question. According to the Yale 
Book of Quotations the source of the statement is rather the lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe, 1869 (Shapiro, 
2006).  
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Summary of plausible mechanisms and effects 
 
The two previous sections have shown, on the one hand, that the intuitive idea that trans-
parency generates legitimacy - which in turn is an important factor behind the global trans-
parency rush - has strong theoretical backing. Several independent mechanisms derived from 
three well-known general theories of decision-making may help to drive a positive effect. 
There is good reason to believe that transparency can generate legitimacy. On the other hand, 
there is also good reason to believe that the opposite effect may occur. Plausible mechanisms 
that may contribute to a negative effect of transparency on legitimacy were also identified, 
some derived from the same general theories as the positive effects. Figure 1 summarizes the 
inventory of mechanisms and their likely effects. 
  
Fig 1 
 
The applicability and strength of these mechanisms – and subsequently the direction and 
strength of the transparency effect – will inevitably vary depending on the context: How 
concerned is the principal about the risk for moral hazard? To what extent are those who 
watch and listen prepared to consider the arguments of ‘the other side’? How just are the 
procedures clarified perceived to be? How strong are the accountability mechanisms? What 
expectations did the public have on the decision-makers and the state of the world in the 
specific case? 
The conclusion must be that it is difficult to formulate hypotheses about the effect of 
transparency on legitimacy at a general level. The link is complex and highly context depend-
ent. The widespread notion within the global race towards transparency of a straightforward 
positive effect is clearly immature. Transparency reforms are in fact rather unpredictable 
phenomena.  
The empirical study presented in the next sections should be viewed in this light. It at-
tempts to explore some of the complexities in terms of different conditions and different 
variations in and of transparency. Our study will be as context-bound as any other, and more 
empirical research will be needed to define the conditions for the effects found. 
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Testing the transparency effect 
 
As, for example, Etzioni (2010, 394) notes, there are surprisingly few empirical studies of the 
effects of transparency, given the scholarly interest and the high expectations on transpar-
ency reforms. The context-bound nature of the transparency effect on legitimacy means that 
most empirical studies are difficult to generalise from, i.e. the external validity is low. But 
internal validity – correctly determining causality - is also difficult to achieve in studies of 
transparency and legitimacy, not least because of the problem of getting hold of comparable 
data from open and closed-door decision-making. Roberts has pointed out that trust in the 
political institutions has not increased in either Canada or the United States, despite the 
adoption of freedom of information laws (2006b, 119). But such conclusions are highly vul-
nerable to omitted variable bias, i.e. the (lack of) correlation may be spurious. Van der Crui-
jsen and Eijffinger, on the other hand, studied the effect of perceived transparency of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) on trust in the ECB, and found a positive correlation in sur-
vey data from the Netherlands (Van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger 2010). However, as the 
authors point out, the direction of the causality of such correlations is difficult to determine.  
 The strength of our research design, using an experimental method, is that it maximises 
the internal validity of the results. Any variation that we find with respect to the legitimacy of 
the decision-making process has been produced by the different conditions and types of 
transparency that we manipulate. Randomisation helps us control for omitted variable bias. 
The weakness of the experimental method lies in the external validity. As we have argued 
already, however, few studies of transparency and legitimacy will be able to generalise very 
far.    
The decision-making situation that we set up in the experiment takes place in the con-
text of upper secondary schools in a Western European country (age 16-19). The young age 
of the participants and the choice of one national context should be noted. However, devel-
opmental psychologists have demonstrated that high school students from different cultural 
contexts make sophisticated judgments about democratic government similar to adults and 
to each other (see Helwig et al. 2007 and the literature cited therein). Procedural fairness re-
search agrees that perceptions about fair decision-making arrangements travel across 
national contexts (Cohn, White & Sanders 2000).  
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We believe that the mechanisms connecting transparency and legitimacy should be 
equally valid here as in other political contexts that involve representative decision-making. 
The decision-makers in the experiment are representatives of two different constituencies – 
students and teachers – who are set to make a collective decision on rules that bind both 
groups. A third party, the principal acts as a mediator in the negotiations. This decision-
making procedure is called a ‘school conference’, and has been used in real world schools, 
and the situation described to the participants should therefore be sufficiently realistic. 
 
The experimental design 
The experimental sessions took place in classrooms. They were so called vignette experi-
ments, meaning that no real school conference was staged. The participants got to read a 
piece of text and answer questions. All participants were presented with a scenario in which 
new rules of conduct for the school were to be decided. Among the rules that were on the 
table at the school conference two issues were highlighted in particular; the use of mobile 
phones in classrooms, and students’ possibilities to make formal complaints against their 
teachers. According to the scenario the new rules had already been discussed for a period of 
time at the school. On the issue of mobile phones, the vignette informed participants that 
some people advocated tougher rules (students should be forced to give away their phones 
during class, and those who continuously disturbed a lesson by making noise with their 
phone could be expelled), while others preferred softer rules (the phones should be sound-
less during lessons, and students who forgot to turn the sound function off should get a rep-
rimand). Also on the issue of students’ possibilities to file complaints against their teachers, 
the participants were informed that there were diverging views at the school, as some 
thought that complaints should be encouraged and facilitated (a clear statement about the 
right to complain should be explicitly stated in the common rules of the school, and forms 
for complaints should be handed out at the beginning of each term) while others meant that 
a policy aiming at encouraging students to complain could be misused, and therefore should 
not be put in place. The vignette explained that the final decisions were going to be made by 
means of a school conference, constituted by elected representatives from the students and 
the teaching staff, and chaired by the principal of the school.  
All participants took part of this introduction. Thereafter, the experimental manipula-
tions were introduced. The participants were given randomly distributed vignettes including 
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different versions of the decision-making process. Three of the manipulations included dif-
ferent variants of transparency in process, one included only transparency in rationale and 
one had no transparency at all.  
In the non-transparent condition the participants were simply informed about the deci-
sion taken at the school conference. On the issue of mobile phones the school conference 
had decided that these should be turned off or put into a soundless mode during lessons. 
Phones with the sound function on would only be allowed if someone was expecting an im-
portant call, and had informed the teacher so at the beginning of the lesson. A student who 
forgot to turn the sound off once would get a reprimand, and if it happened repeatedly, it 
would be reported to the principal and the parents. With respect to the complaints forms the 
participants were informed that it had been decided that forms should be available in the 
reception, but that they were not going to be handed out to all students.  
The transparent vignettes included the same information on the content of the decisions 
taken, but also some further information. For the transparency in rational condition the par-
ticipants were informed that there was a meeting the day after the school conference where 
the representatives motivated and explained the reasons behind their decisions. These rea-
sons, which referred to common interests and general values, such as proportionality and 
integrity, were also specified in the vignette.  
Three different “Transparency in process”-conditions were operationalised by referring 
to a web camera being installed in the conference room, broadcasting in real time, and mak-
ing it possible for each student to observe the discussion between the students’ and the 
teachers’ representatives. In the first transparency in process condition the participants sim-
ply got the information that the web camera was there, and that they therefore had the op-
portunity to observe the discussion should they want to. This condition relates to a concern 
in the research on freedom of information laws where some observers have been rather 
sceptical about the chances that publicly available information will actually reach the broader 
public, and hence affect legitimacy (Worthy 2010, Roberts 2007). On the other hand, there is 
also evidence that even though the large majority of the general public will most often not 
bother to inform themselves, they still want to have the opportunity to take part of the in-
formation should they so decide (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002). We address this issue by 
comparing the effect of simply having the opportunity to transparency in process to situa-
tions where the information actually reaches the public. 
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In the other two scenarios representing transparency in process, thus, the participants 
got to view parts of the decision-making. They were presented with a written extract from 
the discussions at the school conference (see appendix for the extracts). Furthermore, we 
also wanted to explore the Bismarckian idea that the content of the sausage makes a differ-
ence. In order to do that we needed to decide what are the interesting variations in content 
in democratic politics. We hardly need to test whether revealing corruption or other forms 
of blatant misuse of power will increase legitimacy, it is clear that it will not. But what about 
different modes of (at least formally) legitimate democratic decision-making? To analyse the 
difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ content, therefore, we use the much discussed distinc-
tion between bargaining and deliberation developed in the theory of deliberative democracy.  
One of the core assumptions of deliberative democratic theory is that people prefer and 
expect their representatives to deliberate rather than bargain over public policy (Gutmann & 
Thomson 1996, Elster 1998). Deliberation means trying to reach collective decisions by con-
vincing each other of the right thing to do by means of rational arguments, while bargaining 
implies striking deals on the basis of fixed positions, using threats and promises. The domi-
nant social norm in modern democracies, according to deliberative democratic theory, is that 
bargaining belongs to the market sphere of society, and not to the political sphere (or “the 
forum” in Elster’s words, Elster 1986). One effect of transparency, it is proposed in deliber-
ative democratic theory, is that it has the power to “civilize” politics, as it forces representa-
tives to shift from a bargaining mode to deliberation in order to comply with the norm.  
If the civilizing effect of transparency works as deliberative democratic theory proposes, 
and the decision-making behaviour displayed therefore resembles deliberation rather than 
bargaining, transparency in process is likely to have a positive effect on legitimacy. If it does 
not work, on the other hand, and if bargaining is revealed, deliberative theory would predict 
a disappointment effect.  
In one of the conditions representing transparency in process with actual access to in-
formation, therefore, the discussion that the participants got to see was carried out in a de-
liberative way, meaning that both students and teachers presented relevant arguments and 
were portrayed as taking each others arguments into account, and to be sincerely concerned 
with finding the best solution for everyone. In the end, in the deliberative scenario, they 
managed to reach consensus on both issues. In the other condition the discussion was car-
ried out in a bargaining way. The actors were negotiating on the basis of self-interested pre-
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ferences in a haggling manner, exchanging threats and promises rather than public-regarding 
arguments. Eventually, in the bargaining condition, the representatives agreed to horse-trade 
an agreement by exchanging concessions on the mobile phone issue for concessions on the 
complaint forms issue. The post-decision motivation was the same in the bargaining condi-
tion as in the other transparent scenarios. 
In sum, there were five different experimental manipulations, with 80 participants in 
each condition:    
 
- No transparency 
(1) The final decision simply announced to the participants  
 
- Transparency in rationale 
 (2) The final decision announced to the participants + a motivation on behalf of the 
representatives outlining the reasons behind the decision  
 
-  Transparency in process 
 (3) The final decision announced to the participants + a motivation on behalf of the 
representatives outlining the reasons behind the decision + participants informed that 
there was an opportunity to observe the discussion via a web camera.   
 (4) The final decision announced to the participants + a motivation on behalf of the 
representatives outlining the reasons behind the decision + participants informed that 
there was an opportunity to observe the discussion via a web camera + participants ac-
tually observing an extract from a negotiation conducted in a bargaining mode    
 (5) The final decision announced to the participants + a motivation on behalf of the 
representatives outlining the reasons behind the decision + participants informed that 
there was an opportunity to observe the discussion via a web camera + participants ac-
tually observing an extract from a negotiation conducted in a deliberative mode    
 
It should be noted that the participants in the first two scenarios were not informed about 
the possibility of installing a web camera in the conference room. The denied possibility to 
transparency in process was therefore only implicit. As already mentioned, research in social 
psychology has shown that there is an important difference between situations in which per-
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sons are explicitly denied the possibility to voice their opinion about a decision, and situa-
tions in which a person is not given any information on whether or not there was a choice of 
allowing opportunity to voice. Explicitly denying voice has stronger effects than implicit 
denying, probably because it makes the participants aware of the process and therefore 
primed to think about fairness of the procedure (van den Bos 1999). In that respect our test 
of the link between transparency and legitimacy is a tough one for the positive scenario. We 
would have expected stronger positive effects of transparency if secrecy was explicit.    
 After the introduction, before the manipulated scenarios were introduced, the partici-
pants were asked to answer some questions regarding their initial opinions about the deci-
sion. A large majority of the students (83 percent), unsurprisingly, preferred the softer regu-
lations on the use of mobile phones, and a slight majority (52 percent) wanted complaints to 
be encouraged and facilitated. Issue salience was measured using a 7-point scale from 1 (the 
issue is not important at all) to 7 (the issue is very important). Mean values were 3.86 for 
regulations about mobile phones and 5.13 for the issue of making complaints about teachers, 
indicating that the issues were considered to be fairly important to the students. 
After taking part of the scenarios, the participants filled in a questionnaire. Our depend-
ent variable operationalising legitimacy is procedure acceptance, which refers to perceptions 
of the decision-making procedure. It was measured by an index consisting of two items: 
“How fair do you think it was, the way in which the decision was taken?”, and “How fair do 
you think you were treated when the decision was taken?” (Cronbach’s  .867). The re-
sponses were given on seven-points scales running from 1 (unfair) to 7 (very fair).  
We have checked the randomisation with respect to variables that might interfere with 
the transparency effect. Overall, the randomization process worked satisfactorily. ANOVA 
showed no significant differences between the groups with regard to initial opinion about 
the regulations, gender and political interest. However, political orientation, indicated on a 
left-right scale, was unequally distributed between some of the groups. To rule out any bias 
as a consequence political orientation is included as a technical control in the empirical ana-
lyses.   
As a manipulation check, all participants indicated the extent to which they thought they 
had had the possibility to become informed about how the new rules had been decided. As 
expected, the participants rated their possibilities to become informed about the decision-
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making significantly higher in the public decision-making procedures than in the secret ones, 
which indicates that the manipulations were perceived as intended.  
 
 
Results 
 
Table one shows a series of regression analyses with procedure acceptance as the dependent 
variable, and the different experimental conditions as independent variables (including politi-
cal orientation as a control). The first model uses the non-transparent condition as the refer-
ence category. It shows that all the transparency scenarios positively and significantly add to 
the degree of procedure acceptance compared to the non-transparent scenario. The strong-
est positive effect comes from the transparency in process condition where the participants 
took part of a decision-making session close to the deliberative democratic ideal (1.10). The 
weakest positive effect, although still statistically significant compared to the non-transparent 
scenario, comes from transparency in rationale (0.47). Observing “bad” content in terms of 
bargaining behaviour also significantly increases procedure acceptance compared to the non-
transparent condition (0.76), as does the mere opportunity to take part of the decision-
making (0.59). 
The results are summarized in figure 2, which shows the mean values on the proced-
ure acceptance index for the five different conditions, calculated from model 1 in table one. 
The pattern is rather striking. The more open the decision-making process, and the more 
information the participants get concerning the reasoning behind the chosen policy, the 
higher the procedure acceptance. Those participants who witnessed the “civilized” deliberat-
ive session were most satisfied with the procedure. Not all the differences are statistically 
significant, however. Models 2 to 4 in table 1 show the uncertainty of the differences in 
means between the different transparency conditions. As demonstrated by the prefixes in 
figure 2, the differences between transparency in rationale and the two non-deliberative 
transparency in process conditions cannot be confirmed with conventional levels of certainty 
(prefix b). The same applies for the two transparency in process scenarios which included 
extracts from the discussions (prefix c).  
Three observations follow from these findings. First, it is clear that transparency can 
have the positive effect on legitimacy that is the motive behind many political and adminis-
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trative transparency reforms. Although again we want to emphasise the context-bound na-
ture of these results, the pattern is clear and the effects are fairly strong, with an increase on 
the procedure acceptance index by more than 30 percent from no transparency to transpar-
ency in process with deliberation. In this context, at least, transparency works. 
Second, and perhaps more unexpectedly, transparency in rationale competes well 
with transparency in process in raising the level of legitimacy. In fact, in our study, only if 
transparency reveals decision-making close to the deliberative democratic ideal will transpar-
ency in process improve on transparency in rationale, with reasonable certainty. Including 
the opportunity to watch, or actually watching a bargaining session, does not significantly 
improve on transparency in rational. Given the potential costs involved with “fishbowl 
transparency”, as described in the literature, transparency in rationale should in many cir-
cumstances be a fair price for achieving legitimacy.   
A third observation is that bargaining is less appreciated by the participants in the 
experiment compared to deliberation (although the difference between these two fails con-
ventional significance levels in model 4 (p=0.13)), but still clearly better than no transparency 
at all. Being exposed to our definition of bad – but still at least legally legitimate – behaviour 
was preferred to not having any information at all about the process. This finding speaks to 
the question of whether bad news in the media as a result of freedom of information acts 
will improve legitimacy (c.f. Worthy 2010). As long as the news presents actions on behalf of 
the decision-makers that do not involve outright corruption or other blatantly unacceptable 
behaviour, bad news may still be better than no news. 
Apparently, the mechanisms suggested as drivers behind a negative effect (anticipa-
tion of sub-optimal decisions, frustration with no-voice, disappointment) have not been ac-
tivated in any substantial way in this case. Precisely which mechanisms that contribute to the 
results is difficult to determine. Looking at the findings, however, agency theory’s proposed 
positive effect as a result of a reduced risk for moral hazard does not seem to fit very well. 
Transparency in rationale is not dismissed as cheap talk, and there is no significant extra le-
gitimacy bonus compared to transparency in rationale from simply having the opportunity to 
watch the decision-making process, although this should generate an increased sense of con-
trol. The added positive effect of watching representatives behave in a deliberative mode, 
compared to simply having the opportunity to watch, is also difficult to understand from an 
agency perspective. It is most likely therefore that the legitimacy generated by increasing 
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transparency in the school conference comes from the procedural justice and/or deliberative 
democratic theory mechanisms.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The idea that transparency generates legitimacy gives elites a rationale for endorsing, or at 
least not blocking, the trend towards increased transparency in politics and public adminis-
tration. Although working in a goldfish bowl entails costs for governments the prospect of 
increased support weighs heavily on the other side. We have shown that there is fairly strong 
support for a positive link between transparency and legitimacy to be found in several gen-
eral theories of decision-making. However – depending on the context –  there is also a risk 
that mechanisms that drive a negative effect are activated. Transparency reforms are rather 
unpredictable phenomena. 
Our empirical study of representative decision-making in a school context gave sup-
port for the general idea that transparency can generate legitimacy. It also demonstrated, 
however, that relatively modest transparency reforms – transparency in rationale - may con-
tribute to similar degrees of added legitimacy as more far-reaching transparency in process 
measures. Decision-makers who are unable to live up to the deliberative democratic ideal 
may significantly improve their legitimacy by simply motivating carefully afterwards the deci-
sions taken behind closed doors.  
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Figure 1. Summary of mechanisms and effects of transparency on legitimacy  
 
 Transparency in rationale Transparency in process 
Positive effect on  
legitimacy 
Deliberative democracy theory:  
- increased understanding of 
and respect for a) substance of 
decision and b) the others 
 
Procedural fairness theory: 
- procedures made more fair 
Agency theory: 
- reduce moral hazard through 
increased control 
 
Deliberative democracy theory:  
- increased understanding of and 
respect for a) content of decision 
and b) the others 
 
Procedural fairness theory: 
- procedures made more fair 
- fair procedures clarified 
 
Negative effect on  
legitimacy 
Bismarck: 
- disappointment (of decision-
makers or state of the world) 
 
 
Agency theory: 
- anticipate sub-optimal deci-
sions 
 
Procedural fairness theory: 
- frustration (caused by in-
creased sense of powerlessness) 
 
Bismarck: 
- disappointment (of decision-
makers or state of the world) 
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Figure 2. Mean procedure acceptance for the different conditions 
 
 
Note: Mean values of procedure acceptance (controlling for political orientation). Values 
with no subscript (a, b, c) in common differ significantly (p < .05). 
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Table 1: Effects of different transparency conditions on procedure acceptance 
 
 Procedure acceptance 
Variables Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
 
Transp. in process  
(deliberation) 
 
1.10*** 
(.23) 
 
.63*** 
(.23) 
 
.52** 
(.23) 
 
.35 
(.23) 
 
Transp. in process  
(bargaining) 
 
.76*** 
(.23) 
 
.28 
(.23) 
 
.17 
(.23) 
 
 
Transp. in process 
(opportunity) 
 
.59** 
(.23) 
 
.11 
(.23) 
  
-.17 
(.23) 
 
Transp. in ration-
ale 
 
.47** 
(.23) 
 
 
 
-.11 
(.23) 
 
-.28 
(.23) 
No transparency  -.47** 
(.23) 
-.59** 
(.23) 
-.76*** 
(.23) 
Political orienta-
tion 
.15*** 
(.05) 
.15*** 
(.05) 
.15*** 
(.05) 
.15*** 
(.05) 
 
Constant 
 
 
3.42*** 
(.23) 
 
3.89*** 
(.23) 
 
4.00*** 
(.25) 
 
4.18*** 
(.25) 
 
N 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
Adjusted R2 .07 .07 .07 .07 
Note: OLS regressions. ***p<.01 ** p<.05 *p<.10 Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix 
 
Extracts from the discussion presented in the “Transparency in process”- condition: 
 
Deliberation condition 
 
The school conference is held on an afternoon in the school’s staffroom. Everyone at the 
school has the possibility to see and hear the discussions via a web-camera which has 
been installed for this purpose. Below is an extract from the discussion which concerns 
mobile phones and forms of complaint: 
 
Principal: Ok, then we have the question concerning mobile phones during class. 
Teacher-representative: Yes, for us teachers it’s incredibly annoying with these beep-
ing texts (SMS) and students sitting and fiddling with their phones. I must say that I have 
a hard time understanding why it’s so important to bring your phone to school in the first 
place. When I went to school there where no phones, but it went fine anyway. And there 
are phones at the school office if you need to reach someone in an emergency. 
Student-representative: But for a lot of young people the mobile phone is extremely 
important – you have your friends there and your music and other things. Besides, today 
almost everyone has a mobile phone and we can’t prohibit them, can we? 
Teacher-representative: No, ok, but we must make sure that they don’t interrupt the 
classes. You students must also agree with this? 
Student-representative: Well, sure. Let’s decide that the mobile phones must always 
be in silent mode in the classroom?  
Teacher-representative: But there’s a risk that there will always be someone who will 
forget, consciously or not, to turn of their mobile phone if they have it with them. Instead, 
can’t we decide that the students hand in their mobile phones in a box by the door when 
they enter the classroom? 
Student-representative: I don’t think that sounds like a good idea. I think a lot of stu-
dents will find being forced to hand in their mobile phones as insulting their integrity. It’s 
also a risk that you confuse your mobile phone to be your own when it’s someone else’s if 
you have the same kind. And think about all the commotion when people are going to dig 
in that box on their way out- it will take half of the recess! 
Teacher-representative: Ok, that might not have been a good idea. But if we should 
allow that the mobile phones can be taken into the classroom, there must be punishments 
towards them who don’t behave and keep the mobile phone silent. Or else, we will never 
solve the problem. 
Student-representative: Of course you should get a reprimand if you disturb the class. 
Teacher- representative: But a reprimand is not enough, is it? It must be something 
that repels. I think that if you forget to turn off your mobile phone, the teacher should be 
able to dismiss the student and report it to the principal and to the student’s home. If it 
occurs on several occasions, I actually think the student should be able to be suspended 
from school during a period of time.  
Student- representative: Seriously, isn’t that an overreaction? What should we then 
use to punish students who do even worse things, like bullying and vandalism? 
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Teacher- representative: You’re right, the punishment must be appropriate in com-
parison to other misdemeanour. Should we say that the first time it occurs, you’ll get a 
reprimand, and the second time, you’ll be dismissed from class and it will be reported to 
the principal and to the student’s home? 
Student- representative: Yes, that sounds like a good idea.  
Principal: Ok, let’s continue with the question concerning forms of complaint. Con-
sequently, it concerns the issue of whether we should include in the rules of conduct that 
the students have the right to complain, either if the teacher has arrived late for class, or 
if the student experiences that the teacher behaves insultingly towards a student in the 
class. This also concerns to what extent we should encourage the students to complain. 
Student- representative: Yes, well we think that it’s extremely important that the rules 
of conduct don’t just mean that the students should behave, but the teachers too. We think 
that the forms should be distributed to all the students the first day of the term so that 
they definitely have it, and that the forms shall be available and that they can be submit-
ted in a box outside the school cafeteria.  
Teacher- representative: Of course the students should be able to make a complaint if 
a teacher makes a mistake, but in this matter, one should be careful. There is a risk that 
the system will be misused by students who are angry with their teacher for not giving 
them the grade they wanted. Teachers can be exposed to bullying and they can feel forced 
to give a higher grade to rowdy students in order to avoid getting notified all the time. 
We must make sure that the forms will not be misused. 
Student- representative: There can be some reason in that, but students must also feel 
that they have the possibility to exercise their rights, aren’t they? 
Teacher- representative: Of course, but you don’t have to encourage complaints in 
that manner. Can’t we decide that we keep the complaints outside the rules of conduct 
but make sure to inform that the forms of complaint are at the school office?  
Student- representative: Ok, if something really serious happens you’ll easily be able 
to find the forms there. 
Principal: Let’s decide that. 
 
 
Bargaining condition 
 
The school conference is held on an afternoon in the school’s staffroom. Everyone at the 
school has the possibility to see and hear the discussions via a web-camera which has 
been installed for this purpose. Below is an extract from the discussion, which concerns 
mobile phones and forms of complaints.  
 
Principal: Ok, then we have the question concerning mobile phones during class. 
Teacher-representative: Yes, for us teachers it’s incredibly annoying with these beep-
ing texts (SMS) and students sitting and fiddling with their phones. I must say that I have 
a hard time understanding why it’s so important to bring your phone to school in the first 
place. When I went to school there where no phones, but it went fine anyway. And there 
are phones at the school office if you need to reach someone in an emergency. 
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Student-representative: But for a lot of young people the mobile phone is extremely 
important – you have your friends there and your music and other things. Besides, today 
almost everyone has a mobile phone and we can’t prohibit them, can we? 
Teacher- representative: No, ok, but we must at least make sure that they don’t dis-
turb the class, that’s an absolute demand from us teachers.  
Student- representative: Ok, it’s in the students’ interest that it’s calm during class as 
well. Therefore, we suggest that the mobile phones always have to be in silent mode in 
the classroom.  
Teacher- representative: But there is always a risk that someone forgets, consciously 
or not, to turn of their mobile phone if they have it with them. We, the teachers, would 
rather want the students to hand in their mobile phones in a box by the door before they 
enter the classroom.  
Student- representative: We can’t accept that. A lot of students will find that insulting 
their integrity by forcing them to hand in their mobile phones. And think about all the 
commotion when people are going to dig in that box on their way out- it will take half of 
the recess! 
Teacher- representative: If we shall go along with letting in mobile phones in the 
classroom there must be proper punishments for those who don’t switch off their phone. 
Or else, we’ll never agree. 
Student- representative: We can accept that you’ll get a reprimand if you disturb the 
class. 
Teacher- representative: A reprimand is completely inadequate. It must be something 
that repels. We demand that as a teacher you have the right to be able to dismiss the stu-
dent from class and report it to the principal and to the student’s home if you forget the 
mobile phone on. If this occurs on numerous occasions, the student should be able to be 
suspended from school during a period of time. 
Student- representative: That is totally unacceptable for us. Suspension from school 
is a completely too harsh punishment in this case. We won’t agree to any rules of conduct 
what so ever if you don’t take back that demand. 
Principal: Ok, it seems like your opinions stand quite firm here. Should we move on 
to the question concerning the forms of complaint instead? Consequently, it concerns the 
issue of whether we shall include in the rules of conduct that the students have the right 
to complain, either if the teacher has arrived late for class, or if the student experiences 
that the teacher behaves insultingly towards a student in the class. This also concerns to 
what extent we shall encourage the students to complain. 
Student- representative: Yes, well we think that it’s extremely important that the rules 
of conduct don’t just mean that the students should behave, but the teachers too. We think 
that the forms should be distributed to all the students the first day of the term so that 
they definitely have it, and that the forms shall be available and that they can be submit-
ted in a box outside the school cafeteria.  
Teacher- representative: We will never agree to that. There is a risk that the system 
will be misused by students who are angry with their teachers for not giving them the 
grades they wanted. Teachers can be exposed to bullying and they can feel forced to give 
higher grades to rowdy students to avoid getting notified all the time.  
Student- representative: But students must also feel that they have the right to exer-
cise their rights, shouldn’t they? 
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Teacher- representative: It doesn’t mean that we should encourage making com-
plaints in that manner. 
Student- representative: Ok, what about making a compromise here. Let’s skip our 
demand concerning the distribution of forms of complaint and that the right to complain 
is included in the rules of conduct if you settle with giving a reprimand if someone forgets 
their mobile phone on? However, the students shall be informed that the forms of com-
plaints are available at the school office.  
Teacher- representative: Well, ok about the forms of complaint, and we can agree to 
give reprimands the first time someone forgets a mobile phone on, but there must be 
possibilities to be able to dismiss students from class as well as reporting to the principal 
and to the student’s home if it occurs on numerous occasions! 
Student- representative: Ok, let’s decide that.  
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